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Abstract 
Lending retail deposits to SMEs and household borrowers may be the traditional role of 
commercial banks: but banking in Britain has been transformed by increasing consolidation 
and by the lure of high returns available from wholesale Investment activities. With 
appropriate changes to the baseline model of commercial banking in Allen and Gale (2007), 
we show how market power enables banks to collect „seigniorage‟; and how „tail risk‟ 
investment allows losses to be shifted onto the taxpayer. 
In principle, the high franchise values associated with market power assist regulatory capital 
requirements to check risk-taking. But when big banks act strategically, bailout expectations 
can undermine these disciplining devices: and the taxpayer ends up „on the hook‟ - as in the 
recent crisis. That structural change is needed to prevent a repeat seems clear from the 
Vickers report, which proposes to protect the taxpayer by a „ring fence‟ separating 
commercial and investment banking. 
Key Words:  Money and banking, Seigniorage, Risk-taking, Bailouts, Regulation  
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‘Expansion in the variety of intermediaries and financial transactions has major 
benefits…[But] it has potential downsides … to do with incentives’. Rajan (2005) 
 
Introduction 
 
With the adoption of Inflation Targeting, monetary policy in the UK came to consist 
essentially in setting the discount rate, without any special attention to monetary aggregates. 
The shift of focus from monitoring developments in money and banking to policy rules for 
interest rates was reflected in the widespread adoption of DSGE models by Central Banks -- 
with Taylor rules used to determine interest rates and the assumption of efficient markets 
used to justify „light touch‟ regulation. The granting of operational independence in setting 
interest rates to the Bank of England in 1997 was, indeed, accompanied by a transfer of 
responsibility for Financial Stability to the FSA – a newly created agency that ipso facto 
lacked practical experience .  
In fact, the combined forces of increased globalization and reduced regulation led to 
extraordinary developments in UK banking-  an unprecedented increase in the size and 
profitability of banking relative to GDP, (see charts in Appendix A, based on Haldane et al, 
2010), with a pronounced degree of market concentration (see ICB, 2010, p.9). Although, at 
the time, it seemed that this headlong expansion was achieved without any great increase in 
risk, it ended in severe liquidity runs and solvency crises with two mortgage banks being 
nationalised and major two universal banks rescued with substantial capital support from the 
Treasury.  
Chastened by this episode, macroeconomists are busy adding financial frictions to their 
models. For banking, too, there is surely a case for retooling. The account of banking to be 
found in Allen and Gale‟s widely acclaimed monograph Understanding Financial Crisis 
published in 2007, for example, is of small, competitive, utility banks. In this paper, 
therefore, starting with this traditional model of competitive banking as a baseline, we first 
add the concentration of market power -- and draw out the consequence that banks will 
collect the seigniorage attached to monopoly in money creation. Next we add the taking on of 
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risk associated with wholesale and investment banking
2
 and why this may not be apparent if 
it is „tail risk‟. Then we turn to an issue emphasized by Andy Haldane, Director of Financial 
Stability at the Bank of England, namely the shift in strategic power that has taken place as 
banks have grown so large in size and complexity that the state is forced to bail them out with 
taxpayers money -- an issue tackled in the Final Report of the Independent Commission on 
Banking (2011) in terms of „getting the taxpayer off the hook‟. 
Two informational paradigms 
Before embarking on detailed analysis, an important issue to be confronted is whether the 
players in the industry were aware of the severe risk of insolvency to which the banks were 
exposed, or not. Were they as unaware of the trouble in store as those outside the industry – 
the politicians, for example, happy to see such success for enterprise in Britain and the taxes 
it was yielding; or the regulators, willing to let the industry run on a loose leash with „light 
touch‟ regulation; or depositors, amazed at the salaries paid by the rapidly expanding 
investment arms of previously staid commercial banks, but confident that their money 
remained in safe hands? 
Two contrasting informational paradigms may be considered. The first, that of asymmetric 
information
3
, where banks were aware of risk but outsiders were not, is the perspective taken 
by Hellman et al. (2000) in analysing regulations to check excessive risk-taking („gambling‟) 
by those managing bank portfolios; and by Rajan (2005), whose assessment of the powerful 
incentives for taking on tail risk is widely regarded as a prescient early-warning of the crisis 
to come
4
. It is also the view taken subsequently by Paul Wooley in The Future of Finance 
(2010, Chapter Three). 
The second paradigm, what de la Torre and Ize (2011) call one of collective cognition, is 
where neither principal nor agent is aware of the downside risks associated with new 
                                                             
2 Involving the provision of finance to other financial institutions and large corporations, assisting governments 
and large corporations in raising equity and debt finance, advising on M&A, acting as counterparty to client 
trades, etc see ICB (2010, p.45). 
3 with the associated principal/agent problem of how to design incentives to promote the objectives of the 
principal even though the agent is better informed. 
4
 It was the approach used, more broadly, to warn of the risks of corporate looting in an earlier paper by Akerlof 
and Romer (1993). 
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investment strategies
5
. This is the perspective taken by Gennaioli et al. (2011), for example, 
in their paper on “Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility”. 
Though the policy implications may differ, the two approaches are close to being 
observationally equivalent: risks are taken which lead to insolvency -- and possibly to 
emergency rescue packages for failing financial firms. Nor does asking the players help: even 
if there is asymmetric access to information, the agent may choose to neglect some factors ex 
ante and and/or to feign ignorance ex post. 
Recognising that the distribution of information is endogenous might help to discriminate 
between these two approaches, however, as in the discussion of distorted incentives by Rajan 
(2005). One of these distortions is: 
„the incentive to take risk that is concealed from investors – since risk and return 
are related, the manager then looks as if he outperforms peers given the risk he 
takes. Typically, the kinds of risks that can be concealed most easily, given the 
requirement of periodic reporting, are risks that generate severe adverse 
consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation 
the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks.‟ Rajan (2005, p. 316)  
A simple example, from Rajan (2010, pp. 138-9), is of a financial manager, with a safe 
security on the balance sheet, who posts returns that include the premiums on an out-of-the-
money put – conveniently left off balance sheet. The overall return on such a portfolio will be 
elevated because of the risk involved – but this will not be apparent for some time (because it 
is „in the tail‟) and, as a contingent liability, can be left off balance sheet. So the investor can 
collect what is effectively the risk premium as a bonus, leaving the firm badly exposed as and 
when the downside appears
6
. The names of the trading strategies that were being used also 
suggest an ex ante awareness of risk: they include, apparently: 
IBG (I‟ll Be Gone if it doesn‟t work), and in Chicago, the O‟Hare Option (buy a ticket 
departing from O‟Hare International Airport: if the strategy fails, use it; if the strategy 
succeeds, tear up the ticket and return to the office). That such strategies were common 
enough in the industry as to have names suggests that not all traders were oblivious of 
the risks they were taking.    Rajan (2010, p.139). 
                                                             
5 In the words of Charles Goodhart at the Herriot Watt Conference: „The depositors didn‟t know, the regulators 
didn‟t know; the banks themselves did not know [of the risks inherent in expanding their portfolios]‟. 
6
  Foster and Young (2011) demonstrate further that the use of financial derivatives to reshape portfolio returns 
makes it almost impossible to discriminate the true alpha investor from a mimic on the basis of realised returns 
for an extended period of time. 
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In these circumstances, we have opted for the principal/agent paradigm in the analysis of the 
banking crisis that follows
7
, grafting the „gambling‟ model of Hellman et al. (2000) onto the 
base-line model of Allen and Gale (2007), modified to include seigniorage and risk as 
discussed above. But it is important that proposed reform measures be robust to the choice of 
paradigm. 
Strategic balance of banks and the state 
To the extent that seigniorage increases the „franchise‟ value of banking, so, it might be 
reasoned, monopoly power will help to check excessive risk-taking, and complement 
official regulation in the form of required capital and real time monitoring. But this ignores 
the strategic threat that large banks can pose for society in terms of negative externalities 
that will ensue if they are not rescued after risky gambles that fail -- as can be seen in terms 
of a game where the banks have first-mover advantage.  In this setting, a universal bank 
realises correctly that, given the threat of economic disruption that would follow from 
liquidation, a bail out after a gamble that fails is a subgame perfect response for the 
regulator. As the monopoly bank is insured against risk, it has the incentive to gamble. 
To promote prudent behaviour when banks possess significant strategic power, structural 
reform to shift the balance between large banks and the regulatory authorities is surely 
required. A key issue with regard to the recommendations of ICB in particular is whether 
the proposal to ring-fence retail banking – with the associated ban on many risky strategies 
– will shift strategic power back to the regulator so that bank resolution is a credible threat. 
The model used in this paper is admittedly stylised and compact; and there is, of course, 
an extensive literature on the market structure of the financial sector from the 
perspective of industrial organisation, succinctly summarised in Allen and Gale (2000) 
and Freixas and Rochet (2008), for example. Recent research has used network theory 
to analyse the structure of banking system, focusing on how inter-bank connectivity 
affects the transmission of systemic risk. Gai and Kapadia (2010a) and May and 
Arinaminpathy (2010), for example, study the stability of the banking system using 
random graphs and find that it is typically “robust-yet-fragile” (robust to the failures of 
periphery banks but fragile in respect of failure by central players). Our „moral hazard‟ 
                                                             
7
 When we come to discuss regulatory responses, however, we will consider the extent to which the measures 
proposed are robust – i.e. will work even if the problem is one of „collective cognition‟. 
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approach suggests that concentration may arise for strategic reasons; and we investigate 
how concentration may impact on banks‟ incentives to behave prudently, focusing for 
convenience on the case of monopoly. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the traditional model of 
competitive banking and modifies it to allow for market concentration. In Section 2 we 
analyse the equilibrium when „tail risk‟ investment opportunities are available to a 
monopoly bank with an information advantage; and investigate how far the franchise 
value and/or loss-absorbing capital can ensure prudent behaviour. Section 3 extends the 
analysis to look at the strategic factors that arise when banking is highly concentrated 
and economic externalities come into play. Section 4 looks at implications for banking 
reform -- the ICB proposals in particular. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Utility Banking: competition and concentration 
To fix ideas, we first use the standard three-date model with „early and late‟ consumers 
(depositors) to see how market concentration affects bank profitability. This is done by 
comparing the optimal „take it or leave it‟ deposit contract offered by a monopoly bank with 
the competitive equivalent. 
Following Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Allen and Gale (2007), each 
round has three dates, . There are two assets available to the bank, short and long, 
all associated with constant return to scale technology. The short asset – representing 
accessible storage – lasts only one period, and converts one unit of good today into one unit 
tomorrow. The long asset – representing illiquid but productive investment – takes two 
periods to mature, and converts one unit invested at t = 0 into  units at t = 2 later. There 
is a continuum of ex ante identical depositors with measure 1, each endowed with one unit of 
good at . At , the types of depositors are known, a fraction  of them 
being early consumers who derive utility from consumption only at ; and  fraction 
being late consumers who derive utility from consumption at . 
The ex ante utility of depositors is 
      (1) 
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where  and  are consumptions for early and late consumers, while  is strictly 
increasing and strictly concave. 
Assume that depositors have an outside option which gives a minimum utility of .
 8
 
For depositors to participate in banking, the utility from the deposit contract offered should 
be at least at the level of this outside option, 
.   (3) 
The other incentive constraint is that the banking contract should be able to separate early and 
late consumers (so late consumers have no incentive to withdraw earlier), so  
 .         (4) 
Returns from short and long assets are used to finance early and late consumptions as follows 
          (5) 
and 
 .       (6) 
The sequence of events is such that at , a bank offers a contract  in exchange for 
the depositor‟s endowment. At , the types of the depositors are realised: and, if they are 
the early consumers, they receive . At , the late consumers receive consumption . 
1.1 The competitive case 
The competitive banking solution is illustrated in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis 
represents consumption in date 1 and the vertical the consumption at date 2, and the 
indifference curves represent expected utility of the average depositor. The participation 
constraint on banking outcomes is indicated by the downward sloping convex curve passing 
through the point labelled Market Equilibrium: so feasible deposit contracts are 
restricted to consumption points in the convex set defined by (3). The downward sloping 
straight line  passing through the Market Equilibrium indicates the resource constraint 
                                                             
8 Specifically potential depositors can, after the realisation of types, exchange their endowments with each other 
for early and late consumption goods in capital markets to ensure that  See Allen and Gale 
(2007, pp. 60-64) for discussion of such a market equilibrium. 
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applying to banking equilibria. Bank profitability is zero on  (but positive on , i.e. when 
the line is shifted to the left).  
The competitive contract is illustrated at point A in the figure, where the indifference curve 
(iso-EU) is tangent to the zero profit line ( ). For risk aversion greater than 1, it can be seen 
that .  
 
 
In the standard model of competitive banking discussed above, the capital structure may be 
varied without any implications for the asset side of the balance sheet: and Diamond and 
Dybvig‟s (1983) model of debt-financed banking was promptly complemented by Jacklin‟s 
(1987) version of pure equity banking. The Modigliani and Miller Theorem applies because 
of the assumptions of perfect competition, full information and no risk.
9
  
                                                             
9 Where the bank is fully equity financed, with the shareholders paid dividends in each period, the cost of capital 
is  where  is the per share dividend paid to all shareholders in period i, i.e., the cost of capital is 
the second period dividend per unit invested – corrected for the interim dividend paid out in period 1. With 
perfect competition and no risk, this will match the return on capital, R. 
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Figure 1. Competitive and monopoly banking  
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1.2 Monopoly banking and the ‘seignorage’ on money creation 
„It is well known that financial intermediaries can extract rents by exploiting monopoly 
power through some combination of market share, collusion and barrier to entry‟ (Woolley, 
2010, p.124). This can be accommodated in the traditional banking model without much 
difficulty by allowing for positive profits, as in Chang and Velasco (2001). Here we 
explicitly consider the case of monopoly: in addition to being analytically tractable, this has 
the implication that any failure will be „systemic‟.  
A risk-neutral monopoly bank is assumed to maximise its undiscounted, one round, profits 
by choosing a suitable deposit contract  and investment in short asset, , i.e 
,    (7) 
The first two terms from the profit function are returns from the short and long assets 
respectively, and the last two terms represent early and late consumption. The optimal deposit 
contract is determined when the monopoly bank maximises its profits in (7) subject to 
constraints (3)-(6).  
Since the short asset earns lower returns, the bank will have incentive to minimise its holding 
of x. This implies that (5) must always be binding, i.e. 
          (5‟) 
Replacing x using (5‟), the above problem can be rewritten as 
     (7‟) 
subject to  
       (6‟) 
plus (3) and (4). 
The outcome with monopoly can be characterised as follows: 
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Proposition 1:  
The optimal monopoly banking contract  satisfies the first order condition for inter-
temporal efficiency,  ,  and the participation constraint,  
. This contract exists if and only if 
.        (8) 
and it must satisfy . 
Proof: The existence condition is trivial because otherwise the feasible set is empty. When 
(8) is given by a strict inequality, constraint (6‟) is not binding while (3) binds. In this case, 
the first order condition is given by , which implies  since  and the 
utility function is strictly concave.        QED 
Thus the monopoly bank uses its market power to deny depositors any of the welfare gains 
available to risk pooling. This monopoly solution is shown at point B in Figure 1. Profit 
maximisation subject to the participation constraint is achieved when the profit function  is 
tangent to the indifference curve of the depositor‟s ex ante utility function, 
. 
As regards the distribution of monopoly profits, we assume that these accrue to a limited 
number of shareholders. Thus, while all members of the population have the same unit 
endowment of goods, a small fraction of the population, , are also entitled to share in 
the profits of the monopoly bank. 
The final outcome, as shown in the figure, is one of inter-temporal efficiency but income 
inequality. The majority of the population will expect to achieve the utility associated with no 
banking, being constrained to consume at point B on the participation constraint. 
Shareholders, however, will expect to consume an additional amount which takes them to 
point S, which is the sum of the contract offered by the monopoly bank and their entitlement 
as shareholders. See Appendix B for brief discussion of how this may affect the Gini 
coefficient.  
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2. Banking with ‘tail risk’ 
In discussing its extraordinary expansion of the US banks just before the financial crisis, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p.210) comment: 
The size of the US financial sector more than doubled, from an average of 4% of GDP 
in the mid-1970s to almost 8% of GDP by 2007… Leaders in the financial sector 
argued that in fact their high returns were the result of innovation and genuine value-
added products, and they tended to grossly understate the latent risks their firms were 
undertaking
10
. 
 For analytical convenience, in what follows we leave the real productivity gains generated 
by the financial sector to one side, and focus on the profit to be made due to distorted 
incentives to shift risks into the tail.  
As in Hellman et al. (2000), we assume that the bank exploits the asymmetry of information 
to invest in a risky asset with mean return , whose true prospects for high and low returns 
are private information to the bank. These prospects – to be realised in  – are denoted 
 and  respectively, with probabilities  and   and we only consider 
the case where  is a mean-preserving-spread
11
 of , i.e., . Because of 
the information asymmetry, the downside possibility is not known to the depositors who treat 
the prospect of high returns as safe – the sweet fruits of innovative financial engineering. As 
these high, and seemingly safe, returns are not available outside banks, there is no shift to the 
outside option.  
2.1 ‘Tail risk’ in a Monopoly bank  
We assume there is concentration in banking and focus especially on a monopoly bank which 
offers the non-risky contract  to consumers. Its expected profits are then 
 (13) 
                                                             
10 That the value added from the banking system may be overestimated in the absence of tail risk has been 
documented in Colangelo and Inklaar (2010). Wang et al. (2009) suggest a way to measure properly the 
contribution of the banking sector in a general equilibrium setting. 
11Hellman et al. (2000) use the word gamble to describe the taking-on of the tail risk with lower mean return. 
Note that, we use the term gamble below even when there is no lowering of expected return. Our results would 
remain the same even if the expected return for taking risky investment is lower than the safe return. 
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where the term  represents the realised profits in the high state, 
and  represents the realised profits in the low state. Note 
that if , the bank will not be able to fulfil its contract to late 
consumers, and will be insolvent. What happens in this case is not apparent to the depositors 
ex ante, however: the low-probability financial crisis will be unanticipated. 
To find the optimal deposit contract, one maximises (13) subject to (4) and (5‟). Note that 
here we cannot impose constraint (7‟), even in expected terms, because it is possible that the 
bank is protected by limited liability – and might even be bailed out by the government in the 
low state, as discussed further below. 
The optimal deposit contract is summarised in the following proposition, which covers two 
cases, only the first being relevant here: 
Proposition 2:  
(1) If the bank uses the risky technology, and if , then the 
optimal contract is a solution to  and .  
(2) If , the optimal deposit contract is the same as that in 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
It is worth noting that the gambling bank will offer a deposit contract with dated 
consumptions further apart than for a bank that does not gamble. The optimal deposit contract 
with a gambling monopoly is shown in Figure 2, using the same axes as in Figure 1. As long 
as the gamble succeeds, the effective returns for the long asset will apparently have increased 
to , so the iso-profit functions show a clockwise rotation (see  and ) and the efficiency 
locus also shifts as if there has been a positive productivity shock. But as discussed above 
there is no change in the outside option, so the deposit contract shifts along the original 
participation constraint. Consequently, the optimal deposit contract offered by the gambling 
bank is at B‟‟ where the iso-profit function  is tangent to the binding participation constraint 
(2). Compared with the contract without gambling, date 1 consumption falls and date 2 
consumption increases. As long as the gamble succeeds, so bank profits, ( ), will rise 
13 
 
sharply, as is suggested by the point S representing consumption of owner-managers of the 
monopoly bank. 
2.2 Franchise values and capital buffers as checks on gambling 
Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) consider two regulatory restraints on gambling 
behaviour: either to impose minimum capital requirements and/or to limit deposit rates so as 
to allow banks to make excess profits (as with Regulation Q in the U.S.) – subject to the loss 
of the bank licence if the bank fails in either case. 
As Bhattacharya (1982) points out, however, the threat of losing its franchise could alone 
inhibit gambling by a financial institution; and Allen and Gale (2000, p. 269) note that „the 
incentive for banks to take risks in their investments … is reduced the greater the degree of 
concentration and the higher the level of profits‟.12 Before looking at regulatory intervention, 
consider the possibility of self-regulation via franchise values. 
Self-regulation: franchise value without capital requirements 
Will monopoly profits suffice to check gambling without regulation? To compute the 
franchise value of the monopoly, we consider a repeated game with infinite number of 
possible rounds. Each round has three dates, and the bank exchanges its deposit contract with 
consumers at the beginning of each round. There is no discounting within the round but the 
discount factor between two consecutive rounds is . If the bank does not gamble, 
its capitalised profits are given by the following value function: 
        (14) 
In the context of the model we are using, this quantity  is the “seigniorage” accruing to the 
monopoly bank by virtue of its right to create money. Is this seigniorage large enough such 
that its loss will prevent gambling?  
If the bank gambles, the value function is: 
        (15) 
                                                             
12 Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) have, however, argued that monopoly behavior which generates franchise values 
may also have adverse selection effect as loan rates increase and loan quality deteriorates. 
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This means that the gambling bank can capture current-round profits and future discounted 
profits if the gamble succeeds. But if the gamble fails, losses are taken over by the 
government and shareholders lose the franchise. 
Simplifying (15) yields, 
.        (16) 
To remove the incentive for the bank to gamble, we have to ensure that 
.         (17) 
Using (14) and (16), one can rewrite (17) as 
        (18) 
where the left hand side indicates the one round gain from gambling, and the right hand side 
represents the ex ante cost of gambling: the probability of failed gamble, , times the  
franchise value, . This „no-gambling-condition‟ is similar to that in Hellmann, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (2000).We may characterise the boundary of the no-gambling-constraint, NGC, 
(where (18) holds as an equality, the specific form is given in Appendix C) in terms of ,  
and . 
Proposition 3:  
(1) Given , the boundary of the no-gambling-constraint, , is downward sloping 
in . 
(2) An increase in  will result in a upward shift of the boundary . 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
The boundary of the no-gambling-condition is shown labelled NGC in Figure 2, where the 
horizontal axis indicates the higher returns for the gambling asset in good state and the 
vertical the probability of gambling success. For the distribution of returns on risky 
investment lying below the NGC boundary, the bank will invest prudently; while for the area 
above the NGC boundary, the bank will take on excessive risks. 
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The dotted curve, FYM, in Figure 2 indicates the mimicking strategy of Foster and Young 
(2011), which replicates the safe pay-off with mean-preserving risky investments such that 
, where  is set to zero and  is chosen to reflect the targeted alpha 
investor. For the parameters used in Table 1 below, FYM lies above the NGC, so the bank 
will gamble, as shown at point A for example, where the alpha target  is achieved by 
taking on tail risk
13
(see the entry for  and ). This may be countered by 
imposing capital requirement, k, as discussed in the next Section. 
The essential features of the boundary of no-gambling constraint given in Proposition 3 are 
illustrated by the numerical example in Table 1, where . For these 
parameter values, the monopoly bank makes a seignoirage profit of 0.057, measured in date 2 
consumption. (Given , this implies that almost 3 percent of the endowment will be 
transferred from the depositors to the shareholders even without taking on tail risk.) Entries in 
the table indicate how profits may be boosted by risk-taking for various values of  and .  
                                                             
13 Using standard definition for tail risk, the lower threshold for tail risk is  in our binominal model with 
mean preserving spread, as shown by the dashed horizontal line in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Taking on ‘tail risk’ Gambling 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. No-gambling-condition (NGC) and the mimicking constraint 
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2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
π=0.95      
π=0.9      
π=0.7      
π=0.5      
Table 1: Expected flow of profit for monopoly bank that gambles ( ) 
Clearly, the opportunity for a monopoly bank to take on tail risk can substantially undermine 
its incentive to behave prudently. But the higher the discount factor, the less the incentive for 
the bank to gamble, as the franchise is valued higher. For a discount factor of , entries 
in bold
14
 (in blue) towards the lower left of the table satisfy the no-gambling condition, while 
others fail; however, for a more long-sighted bank with a discount factor of , the 
underlined entries (in red) also satisfy no-gambling condition.
15
  
Capital requirements as a check in gambling 
It is clear from the numerical examples above that when  is small, the franchise value itself 
may not be sufficient to deter gambling. In this case, extra measures are needed to ensure 
correct incentives. So, in what follows, we consider imposing regulatory capital 
requirements. 
With the imposition of a positive capital requirement, , a gambling bank‟s expected profit 
becomes: 
 
where  is measured against total deposits. In the good state, capital will not bring additional 
cost; but in the bad state, the bank will have more to lose. 
The imposition of the capital requirement modifies the no-gambling condition 
. 
                                                             
14 Note that equation (18) is used to check whether each entry satisfies the no-gambling-condition. 
15 Raising δ to 0.95 would be sufficient to ensure that point A satisfies the NGC. 
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Note that  has no effect on the optimal deposit contract offered by the gambling bank, and 
has no effect on  and , so the no-gambling-condition above can be rewritten as 
.      (18‟) 
It is clear that in checking gambling  is a perfect substitute for the franchise value . 
Since  is increasing in  and , the imposition of the capital requirement shifts the no-
gambling boundary, NGC, in Figure 2, upward, reducing the incentive to gamble for any 
given  and . 
It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the efficacy of regulatory capital will also be 
limited by outside options. Securitisation may be one of these: if regulatory burden on banks 
becomes excessive, securitisation may be a form of „regulatory arbitrage‟, helping to move 
the business of banking off-balance sheet. In Appendix D we look ex-ante monitoring – the 
loss of franchise value in particular – an important complement to the ex-post measures 
considered above. 
 
3. Concentration, strategic behaviour and the U-shaped No-
Gambling Boundary  
A further key element not yet considered is the role of negative externalities, what de la Torre 
and Ize (2011) refer to as collective action problem. If the banking sector is highly 
concentrated, the failure of one bank is likely to spread to the whole sector, generating 
systemic risk; so, to prevent a wholesale banking collapse – with all the externalities that will 
involve -- the government may see no alternative but to bailout the failing bank.
16
 Seeing 
itself as “too big to fail” can greatly undermine a bank‟s incentive to invest prudently , as 
Haldane and Alessandri (2009) point out in a paper with the suggestive title “Banking on the 
State”. 
Here too there is a choice of informational paradigms – the view that these are issues of 
which agents are unaware (precisely because they are externalities) and the view that they 
                                                             
16 As the then Chancellor reports: “The risk of one bank collapsing and taking all the others with it was acute. I 
suppose it could have been tried, but I would not have wanted to be responsible for the economic and social 
catastrophe that might follow.” (Darling, 2011, p142) 
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simply chose to keep quiet. Again one might want to look at the incentives to find things out. 
An interesting case in point arose when the FSA sought to establish why big financial firms 
operating in the City of London only looked at minor shocks when conducting stress tests. 
The public officials asked the bankers why their firms had failed to explore the 
possibility of a real blow-up. Was it a result of disaster myopia, or a failure to 
appreciate the dangers of contagion? No, one of the attendees replied. It was nothing 
like that. The problem was that risk departments didn‟t have any incentive to simulate 
genuine disasters. If such an awful eventuality materialized, the simulators would likely 
lose their bonuses and possibly their jobs. And, in any case, the authorities would step 
in and rescue the bank.     Cassidy (2009, p.317) 
As Rajan (2010, p. 151) notes, the same logic may apply even for small firms if traders 
believe that the risky strategies are being so widely used that there will be official 
intervention when collectively they fail:  
But as enough banks imitated the innovators and took on similar risks, and as it 
became common wisdom among market participants that the market would be 
supported in the event of a crisis, there would have been strong incentives to 
load up on tail risks, even if such activity became visible. Rajan (2010, p.151). 
3.1 Bailout as the sub-game perfect equilibrium 
Before discussing in detail how the no-gambling-condition might be modified in the presence 
of “too big to fail” policy, consider the strategic elements involved with the aid of a simple 
two-player game between the banking industry – represented by a monopoly bank -- and the 
state – represented by the taxpayer.17 
In the extensive game shown in Figure 3 we focus on a big bank with substantial franchise 
value.
18
 The players are a Bank and the Taxpayer – assumed also to be a Depositor. It is the 
Bank that moves first, choosing either to pursue traditional Prudent banking or to experiment 
with Innovative behaviour, where for simplicity we ignore capital requirements. The figures 
in parentheses indicate the notional payoffs to the Bank and Taxpayer-cum-Depositor. Note 
that, in order to see whether the Bank is able to profit from risk per se (as argued by Sinn for 
example), Innovative behaviour is taken to involve a mean preserving widening of the spread 
of returns on the portfolio of the Bank. We also assume that there is asymmetric information 
                                                             
17 This is a heroic simplification, of course, as in practice protecting the interests of the taxpayer is delegated to 
a troika of agencies, the Bank of England, Treasury and the FSA. 
18 Prior to this game being played, banks as a group will have chosen whether or not to concentrate as is 
discussed further below.  
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about probabilities of Success or Failure, with the Bank knowing the probabilities (π and 1-π, 
respectively) but not the Taxpayer. (Appendix E is a more realistic case with payoffs 
calculated for a dynamic game using parameter values based on Sinn (2010).) 
 
If the Bank chooses to act Prudent, the safe return of 2 is split equally between Bank and the 
Taxpayer. But if it chooses to innovate the payoffs depend on Nature and the response to 
failure. Nature moves next, awarding Success or Failure to the innovation with equal 
probability, the former generating attractive returns of 4 (with the depositor getting 1 and the 
rest going to the bank) the latter yielding nothing. It is now the Taxpayers turn; action is only 
called for if the Bank fails, however, and there is a choice of closure (Liquidation) or granting 
a Bailout. In the latter case, with payoffs shown as (0,0), the depositor is bailed out by the 
Taxpayer, at zero net gain; and the Bank gets nothing either. If the Bank goes into 
Liquidation, however, (as for Lehman Brothers) it also loses its franchise, f; and, in addition, 
there is a large negative externality for the Taxpayer in the form of economic disruption, x. 
 
Figure 3. Moral hazard as the Taxpayer underwrites risky behaviour 
 
Bank
1 
Prudent 
Failure 
(-f,- x)  
(3,1) 
(1,1) 
,,0 
Innovative 
Success 
Taxpayer
Nature 
Nature 
(0,1-b=0) 
Liquidation Bailout  
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Proceeding by backward induction, we note that the Taxpayer will opt for a Bailout as the 
preferred action at the last stage. Given the expectation of a Bailout, and equal probabilities 
for success and failure, the expected payoffs for the Bank and Taxpayer are (1.5, 0.5) 
Compared to the payoffs from prudent banking (1,1). Innovative behaviour will induce a net 
transfer of 0.5 from the Taxpayer to the Bank. So the Bank can expect to get more from 
taking risks than sticking to prudent banking. 
It is clear from the payoffs that the Taxpayer would prefer the Bank to act prudently and 
avoid risky innovation, but this is not the outcome of the game. Using backward induction, 
the Bank will choose to take risks knowing that the Taxpayer will bail it out as the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium. Since the Taxpayer (who takes the down-side of risky bets) is effectively 
providing insurance for the Bank, this is a classic case of moral hazard. Note that the 
Taxpayer could choose Liquidation were it not for the high social cost of bank failure
19
, the 
externality labelled x, which appears to act as a credible threat: „Liquidate if you dare!‟. If 
this is so, a key element of banking reform will be how to limit this threat. 
The fact that the negative externality acts as a credible threat will surely be relevant to prior 
bank decisions on choosing the level of concentration. If high concentration were chosen, 
bank failures are likely to be systemic, i.e. impose significant negative externality: so failed 
banks will be bailed out. Anticipating this, the dominant strategy for banks is to proceed with 
Mergers & Acquisitions so as to put the Taxpayer on the hook in the event of failure.  
As to the puzzle of why the Taxpayer-cum-Regulator would allow the Bank to innovate if the 
outcome is a net transfer, one must bear in mind that the Taxpayer is assumed to be unaware 
of the probabilities; and may for example believe that the Bank will attract true alpha 
investors who will deliver a high payoff („success‟) for sure -- in which case, innovation 
would lead to better returns to the bank without any transfers (– and the Taxpayer may hope 
to share in some of these benefits by a tax on extra profits).  
 
                                                             
19 Assuming that Liquidation is chosen as a tie breaker. 
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3.2 Concentration and U-shaped No Gambling Boundary 
Can these strategic features be incorporated within the framework developed in Section 2? In 
what follows, we analyse how given concentration can affect bank‟s incentives; then we 
discuss the strategic incentives for choosing high concentration.  
For analytical simplicity, let the degree of concentration,  ( ) be defined by the  
fraction of the monopoly franchise value , , that is obtained if a bank plays safe or is bailed 
out after a failed gamble. To model “too big to fail” policy, TBTF, let the probability the 
government will come to the bank‟s rescue, , increase with , with  
and . The rationale for specifying the bailout policy in this way is as follows: when 
the degree of concentration is low, no bank is “too big to fail”, so the failure of a bank is less 
likely to have systemic effect; when the degree of concentration increases, any bank failure is 
more likely to be systemic, so the probability of attracting bailout increases. The TBTF policy 
used here specifies that if the bank gambles and fails, it may be bailed out by the government 
which will honour all deposit contracts. In this case, the bank loses its equity buffer but its 
franchise is not revoked. 
With a given degree of concentration, the bank‟s profit if it plays safe is a fraction of that 
under monopoly, so the deposit contract offered by these safe banks will be a scaled-up 
version of that offered by the non-gambling monopoly (though each bank makes less profits 
per unit of deposit).  
For the gambling bank under market concentration, , its expected profit, assuming 
, is given by 
 
                                                (19) 
where the probability of losing capital for the gambling banks is . Note that the 
optimal deposit contract with market concentration of , if they exist, would be the same as 
that of a gambling monopoly. 
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Given the capital requirements and the TBTF policy specified above, the no-gambling 
condition is then modified to 
,      (20) 
where  represents franchise value under full monopoly and  the franchise value with 
market concentration of  and the failed gambling bank will be bailed out with probability . 
To summarise the results for the no-gambling boundary (above which banks will not gamble) 
in  and  space for some given  and :  
 
Proposition 4:  
(i) For , the no-gambling boundary is downward sloping in beta and k space.  
(ii) For , the no-gambling boundary is U-shaped in  and  space. 
(iii)Increasing  shift the U-shaped no-gambling boundary upwards. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
The significance of Proposition 4 (iii) is that if the bailout is restricted to banks with less 
attractive gambles (i.e., low  and/or low ) the U-shaped no-gambling boundary will be 
much less pronounced, as we discuss further below. 
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The above framework may be used in a heuristic discussion of options for the reform of the 
UK banking system, distinguishing in particular between reforms related to structure of bank 
balance sheets (the degree of leverage, for example) and those related to markets (such as 
the degree of concentration). For this purpose, we use Figure 4, with market concentration, , 
on the horizontal axis (acting as a proxy for franchise value, assuming that high concentration 
implies high franchise value), and minimum capital requirement, k, on the vertical axis (to 
represent variations in bank leverage).  
The no gambling boundary, defining the shaded area of Prudential Banking, is the U-shaped 
schedule LNR in the figure. The downward slope LN reflects the trade-off between bank‟s 
profitability (franchise value) and the official capital requirement in terms of prudential 
behaviour: as banking becomes more competitive and franchise values fall, so the minimum 
capital requirement will need to be raised to ensure prudence, for any given degree of tail 
Required 
Capital  
Excess  
Risk-taking 
Concentration  TBTF 
Figure 4. How bailouts increase the risk of imprudent banking   
L 
R 
N 
UK 
Excess 
Risk-taking 
Prudent Banking  
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risk.
20
 So the point L in Figure 4 will represent the minimum capital requirement needed 
under perfect competition. 
As Haldane (2010, p.7) points out -- on the basis of commercial ratings -- an increase in 
concentration increases the likelihood of an official bailout, as banks become „Too Big To 
Fail‟. The evidence confirms that risky M&A activity earns the perverse privilege of 
increased access to state bailouts
21
. Taking this factor into account will of course greatly 
encourage bank mergers that lead to high concentration. In circumstances like these, where 
banks can, so to speak, have their cake and eat it, the likelihood of banks behaving prudently 
is sharply reduced, as shown in Figure 4. Let , represented by the dashed line, indicate the 
point at which banks become Too Big To Fail. To the left of this point, between L and N, the 
risk of losing franchise value is sufficient to check gambling: to the right, however, the rise of 
franchise value increases the probability of bailout which encourages gambling. 
Consequently, the region for prudential banking becomes U-shaped, as indicated by the 
shaded area bounded by LNR in the Figure. In the next Section we discuss structural reform 
as a way to remove the strategic threat. 
 
4. Regulatory Reform: the Vickers report 
Various measures for prudential regulation are discussed in Haldane (2011), including equity 
capital requirements (supplemented as appropriate by contingent convertible securities, 
CoCos), strengthening bank governance by modifying control rights, and improving 
performance criteria and remuneration schemes. Here we focus on the recommendations of 
the ICB, chaired by Sir John Vickers, in its Final Report released in September 2011.  
4.1 Key features of the report 
Turning to the key recommendations of this Report, we note that they involve changes in 
market structure as well as balance sheet restrictions.  
                                                             
20 And, a shown in Proposition 4, heightened „tail risk‟ (i.e. increasing ) shifts the no gambling 
boundary LN‟R upwards. 
21 Compare the treatment of High Street banks which were bailed out by official purchase of equity shares 
(Lloyds Banking Group and RBS) as against the mortgage banks (Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley) 
which were nationalised. 
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Structural separation is recommended in the form of a „retail ring-fence‟ designed to isolate 
and contain banking activities where the continuous provision of service is vital to the 
economy and a bank‟s customers so as to ensure that such provision is protected from 
incidental activities and that it can be maintained in the event of bank failure without 
government solvency support. „In essence, ring-fenced banks would take retail deposits, 
provide payments services and supply credit to households and businesses.‟ ICB (2011, para. 
3.1) These services are divided into those which are mandated (involving about 18% of assets 
as of end 2010); are permitted (another 18%); and those which are prohibited (about 64%).   
Ring-fenced banks will thus be banned from a very considerable range of activities currently 
conducted by universal banks. Depending on how much of the second category are taken 
inside the fence, „the ring fence might include between a sixth and a third of the total assets 
of the UK banking sector of over £6 trillion.‟‟ ICB (2011, para. 3.40). (As banks inside the 
fence can stay linked with those outside, subject to arms length and other restrictions, 
however, this is not the complete separation mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA.) 
In addition several steps are recommended in order to increase competition on the High Street 
– increased transparency of costs and transferability of accounts, in particular. 
Balance sheet requirements involve substantial loss-absorbing capacity in the form of equity 
and bonds so as to avoid claims on the taxpayer following bank insolvency. Specifically, the 
Commission recommends that „large UK ring-fenced banks (and the biggest UK Globally 
Significant Banks) be required to hold primary loss-absorbing capacity of at least 17% of 
RWAs which can be increased to a further buffer of up to 3% of RWAs for a bank to the 
extent that its supervisor has doubts about its resolvability‟, ICB (2010, para. 4.118).  
This loss absorbing capacity can be split between equity and bail-in bonds, where the equity-
to-RWAs ratio is at least 10% for ring-fenced banks with 3% or more of UK GDP in RWAs 
(falling to 7% for those with RWAs of 1% of UK GDP), ICB (2010, para. 4.132-134).  
As regards monitoring and transparency, issues discussed in Appendix C, the Commission 
notes that: “[a] ring-fence of this kind would also have the benefit that ring-fence banks 
would be more straightforward than some existing banking structures and thus easier to 
manage, monitor and regulate.” (ICB, 2010, para 3.4) 
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4.2 Getting the taxpayer off the hook: bailout no longer guaranteed 
How can ring-fencing change the strategic relation between the state and banks? With 
reference to the game tree in Figure 3, the fundamental requirement is that the severe 
externalities triggered by unpremeditated bank closure be removed i.e. the payoff to the 
Taxpayer in the case of liquidation be changed from -x to zero
22
. The means to this end 
include (a) improved ex ante monitoring of risk-taking; (b) a great reduction of risks that may 
be taken; (c) substantially increased loss-absorbing capacity on the part of the bank to cover 
what risk remains, and (d) better resolution procedures should the retail bank need to be 
reconstituted.  
Heuristically, this strategy can be illustrated with reference to Figure 5, referring  only to 
banks within the ring-fence, where some of the measures should act to expand the region of 
“Prudential Banking” (beyond that in the earlier Figure 4, indicated here by the dashed U-
shape); others to shift the locus of a ring-fenced bank into this enlarged area.
23
  
 
  
                                                             
22 Assuming that in the event of a tie the taxpayer will prefer liquidation to bail-out. 
23 As access to more exotic gambles was found to shift the U-shaped frontier upwards according to Proposition 
5, so the prohibition of many risky assets – two thirds of the current portfolio of UK banks, in fact   – should 
have the reverse effect, as indicated by the shift from L to L‟ in the No Gambling frontier. Improved monitoring 
- backed by a threat of losing one‟s licence if caught – should further reduce the region of excess risk by making 
the frontier slope down more steeply from L‟. Steps to move the locus  for ring-fenced banks towards Prudential 
Banking  include both the decisive increase in the level of capital required for the operation of a ring-fenced 
bank and steps to increase competition among High Street banks, see the arrow pointing NW in the figure. 
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The various regulatory changes indicated  in the Figure– together with arrangements such as 
„Living Wills‟ for prompt resolution – are, according to the ICB Final Report, designed to get 
the taxpayer „off the hook‟ of bailing out universal banks in trouble. 
The stated purpose of retail „ring-fencing‟ is to get such banks back to the business of taking 
retail deposits, and supplying credit and liquidity to households and businesses. Thus the 
proposed reforms would:  
put the UK banking system of 2019 on an altogether different basis from that of 2007. 
In many respects, however, it would be restorative of what went before in the recent 
past – better capitalised, less leveraged banking more focussed on the needs of savers 
and borrowers in the domestic economy.     ICB (2011, p.18) 
 
We have analysed the Vickers Report from the perspective of asymmetric information. Are 
the proposals still appropriate if there are problems of „collective cognition‟? Perhaps the 
emphasis on ex ante monitoring -- and especially the outright banning of products that appear 
risky -- could be seen as a step away from the Anglo-Saxon principle of common law (where 
Required
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Figure 5. Checking risk-taking in ‘ring-fenced’ banks 
L′ R′ 
 
Ring- 
fenced 
Bank 
Higher capital 
requirements  
and more 
competition 
 
Reduced 
incentive 
to Bailout  
 
 
Excess 
Risk-taking 
 
Risk Prohibition  
& Monitoring 
 
Excess 
Risk-taking 
 
L 
R 
 
28 
 
products are permitted unless found to be dangerous ) towards the Roman law principle (that 
products are banned unless shown to be safe). In this case, as with new medicines, society 
may be protected by shifting the burden of proof onto the innovator -- with some loss of 
efficiency but gains in stability. 
 
5. Conclusion: back to banking basics 
There clearly is a dangerous propensity for banks to take on excessive risks in the current 
regulatory environment: as Vickers (2011, p.2) remarks: “One of the roles of financial 
institutions and markets is efficiently to manage risks. Their failure to do so – and indeed to 
amplify rather than absorb shocks from the economy at large – has been spectacular.”  
Financial innovations, such as securitisation and Credit Default Swaps, have increased the 
ease with which banks can take risky assets onto their balance sheets while satisfying the 
regulatory norms set by Basel. There are clear private incentives for High Street banks to 
expand into investment banking, raising their balance sheets well beyond the needs of 
households and SME borrowers and shifting risk onto depositors and/or the taxpayer by 
greatly increased leverage. But the social cost of interrupting the nationwide provision of 
payments services and credit supply associated with bank failures means that banks that 
combine retail and wholesale activities will be rescued by the government, a threat to the 
economy that effectively puts tax-payers on the hook to underwrite the risks taken by large 
universal banks. 
Nor has the incidence of crisis itself changed these incentives, apparently. As Diane Coyle 
(2011), a former member of the UK Competition Commission, noted as bank profitability 
recovered in 2010-11 despite a still-fragile economy: „The truth is that banks are again doing 
well out of banking, but businesses and consumers are not... Bonuses are back... they are a 
measure of monopoly rents in the business, it does not take great talent to make a profit by 
taking excessive risk, safe from effective competition and sure of a bailout if needed.‟ 
As a contribution to the debate on problems besetting modern banking in Britain, we began 
with a simple model of retail banking and showed how, behind the veil of asymmetric 
information, the incentive to take on risk can easily exceed the threat of losing the franchise – 
especially if the probability of losing the franchised is reduced by the prospect of an official 
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bailout. As the prudential benefits of increased concentration are progressively offset by the 
prospect of rescue, the „prudential frontier‟ relating capital requirements to concentration 
becomes U–shaped. 
This framework – of concentrated banking with asymmetric information – is used to discuss 
the impact of regulatory reforms involving changes to market structure, balance sheet 
restrictions and the efficacy of monitoring. Considering the reforms advocated by the ICB in 
their Final Report in particular, we note that they are designed to offset excess risk-taking and 
promote competition, i.e. to eliminate the very features that we have added to the basic 
banking model to capture current distortions! But they go further. 
A key aim of Mrs Thatcher‟s industrial policy was to reduce the threat to the provision of 
goods and services posed by strikes in the public sector – the confrontation with coal miners 
being a decisive case in point. An important – perhaps the most important – aspect of the 
„ring-fence‟ proposal viewed as industrial policy is how – by reducing the threat of abrupt 
contagious closure on the part of retail banks – it aims to change the strategic balance 
between banking and the state.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A Salient features of banking in Britain  
Two salient characteristics of UK banking are that the key players are universal banks
24
 and 
that the industry is concentrated, „especially in the retail and commercial sector, where the 
top six banks account for 88% of retail deposits‟ ICB (2010, p.9). Two other striking features 
are the rapid expansion of balance sheets prior to the crisis; and the increase in measured 
value added, especially in profits. As can be seen from Chart A1, banking assets doubled 
relative to GDP since 1990, rising to more than five times annual GDP – which represents a 
10-fold increase above the long run historical average of around 50%. 
 
Chart A1: UK banking sector as % of GDP.  
Note: The definition of UK banking sector assets used in the series is broader after 1966, 
but using a narrower definition throughout gives the same profile. 
Source: Haldane et al (2010, p.84)  
 
                                                             
24 i.e., they combine both categories of banking - retail & commercial and wholesale & investment.  
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Evidence of the sharp rise in the measured contribution of banking to national income in the 
run-up to the financial crisis is provided by Haldane et al. (2010), where it is reported that, 
using conventional measures of value added: 
In 2007, financial intermediation accounted for more than 8% of total GVA, compared 
with 5% in 1970. The gross operating surpluses of financial intermediaries show an 
even more dramatic trend. Between 1948 and 1978, intermediation accounted on 
average for around 1.5% of whole economy profits. By 2008, that ratio had risen 
tenfold to about 15% (See Chart A2).  
 
Chart A2: Gross operating surplus of UK private financial corporations (% of 
total)  
Source: Haldane et al (2010, p.68) 
 
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature, however, is that the recent rapid expansion of balance 
sheets and profitability was accompanied by an apparent reduction in the riskiness of bank 
portfolios. As shown in Chart A3, the doubling of leverage from the late 1990s until just 
before the crisis was accompanied by a halving of the fraction of risk-weighted assets. Thus – 
despite the efforts of the Basel Committee to ensure banks were adequately capitalised -- for 
the period 2005-2008, leverage was around 40 for UK banks on average, and considerably 
higher for some.  
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Chart A3: Leverage and risk-taking in UK banks. 
Source: Haldane et al (2010, p.89) 
 
Ex-post, the sliver of equity turned out to be far too slender to absorb the risks actually being 
taken. In the event, official support for the financial sector running to 74 % of GDP 
(including capital injections of more than 5% of GDP) had to be supplied to prevent banking 
collapse
25
. 
                                                             
25
 See Haldane and Alessandri (2009, Annex, Table 1) who also describe various profit-making strategies -  
including taking on tail risk - that contributed to these losses and may have been induced by expectations of 
state support. 
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Appendix B. Gambling and Gini Coefficient: Miracle and Mirage? 
It is evident that in this simplified model, bank concentration will lead to an increase in the 
Gini coefficient compared with competitive banking: and this effect will become much more 
pronounced with gambling. This is illustrated by the stylised Lorenz curves in Figure A1, 
where σ represents the fraction of the population owning shares in the all-deposit bank. If ω 
represents the consumption bundle available to depositors under monopoly banking, and 
ω(1+μ) is the consumption available to the depositors who are also shareholders enjoying the 
monopoly premium, μ, then  and the Gini coefficient26 turns out to be 
. When the bank gambles, the premium paid to owner-managers will of 
course rise, say to , shifting the Lorenz curve to  in the figure.  
In discussing whether the contribution of financial sector is „Miracle or Mirage‟, Haldane et 
al. (2010, pp. 79-80) report that the share of financial intermediation in employment in UK is 
around 4%, and that: 
the measured „productivity miracle‟ in finance …has been reflected in the returns to 
both labour and capital, if not in the quantity of these factors employed. For labour, 
financial intermediation is at the top of the table, with the weekly earnings roughly 
double the whole economy median. This differential widened during this century, 
roughly mirroring the accumulation of leverage within the financial sector.  
Using the above formula, a doubling of consumption opportunities for those in finance would 
add about 4% to the Gini coefficient, i.e. about half the rise in Gini coefficient for the UK 
from 1986 when the Big Bang took place, to just before the crisis in 2007. (Focusing more 
narrowly on Investment Banking, however, the Financial Times reports compensation 
running at 6 times the median income in both US and UK.
27
 
                                                             
26 i.e. the area OLP divided by O1P in the diagram. 
27 FT, Feb 17th, 2011, „Banker‟s pay: time for deep cuts.‟ 
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Appendix C. Proof of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 3 
If  is low enough, the bank cannot honour the contract to the late consumers in the low 
state (the late consumption in this case is honoured by the insuring agency). So the bank‟s 
profits are given by . This changes the first order condition to 
. Together with the binding participation constraint, one can then determine the 
optimal contract as in the second part of Proposition 4. (Since case (2) has the same deposit 
contract as that under certainty and no default from the bank, we use case (1) to represent 
gambling.) 
If  is large, the bank can honour the contract to the late consumers in either state. So the 
optimal contract satisfies the first order condition . With the 
binding participation constraint the same as in Proposition 1, the optimal contract must be the 
same. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Given the monopoly bank will gamble, it is best for it to choose the deposit contract  
specified in Proposition (4). In this case, to ensure that the bank will gamble, condition (18) 
becomes 
.     (B1) 
Similarly, given the monopoly bank will not gamble, it is best for it to choose the deposit 
contract  specified in Proposition (3.1). To ensure that the bank will not gamble, 
condition (18) becomes 
.     (B2) 
For some given parameters of ,  and , it is always possible to have 
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.     (B3) 
If (B3) is satisfied, then both (B1) and (B2) are true as  
 and . So for the set of parameter values 
such that (B3) holds, the monopoly bank may choose either to gamble or to play safe. 
Now we show that in  and  space, for a given delta, the boundary specified in (B3) lies 
below the boundary where (B2) holds as an equality and above the boundary where (B1) 
holds as an equality. To simplify comparison, we fix the value for . Then, we can select the 
appropriate value for  such that (B3) holds. In this case, (B2) is satisfied. To ensure (B2) 
holds as an equality, we have to increase the value of . Since , the  
which ensures that (B2) is an equality must be greater than or equal to the  for which (B3) 
holds. So the boundary of (B3) lies below the boundary where (B2) is an equality. Similarly, 
one can show that (B3) also lies above the boundary where (B1) is an equality. 
In  and  space, multiplicity of equilibria occurs in the area bounded by the boundaries of 
(B1) and (B2). So the sufficient condition to ensure no gambling is to choose the parameters 
of  and  such that they lie below the boundary of (B1). In what follows, we characterise 
the general properties of this boundary. 
(1) Rewrite the no-gambling condition as 
.       (B4) 
Note that the contract offered by the gambling bank, , must satisfy the first order 
condition 
,         (B5) 
and the binding participation constraint 
.       (B6) 
So, it is clear that ,  and . This implies . 
Using (B5) and (B6), one can show that 
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       (B7) 
Applying the envelope theorem, one obtains,  
,        (B8)  
and  
.      (B9) 
Differentiating the no-gambling condition (B4) with respect to  and  yields 
 
(B10) 
Since both terms before  and  are positive, the no-gambling condition must slope 
downward in  and  space. 
Finally, note that if  and , then (B4) holds. So the no-gambling boundary starts 
from  in the  and  space and goes asymptotically towards the  axis. 
(2) An increase in  increases the coefficient of the second term in (B4), . To 
maintain equality,  has to increase for a fixed . Note that all no-gambling boundaries start 
from , so an increase in  swivels the no-gambling boundary upwards in the  and  
space. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
As is shown in the proof of Proposition 5 above, it is sufficient to specify the no-gambling 
condition (20) as 
,   (B10) 
where  is the optimal deposit contract offered by the gambling bank. 
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For , , so (B10) can be rewritten as 
   (B11) 
Note that the deposit contract  is unaffected by either  or , so to keep (B11) as an 
equality, a reduction in  must be compensated by an appropriate increase in . This 
generates the downward sloping section of the no-gambling condition in  and  space. 
 
For , we rewrite (B10) as 
. (B12) 
Since the left hand side is independent of  and , maintaining (B12) as an equality requires 
the right hand side to be a constant. Differentiating the right hand side with respect to  or , 
one can obtain the slope of the no-gambling condition as 
.       (B13) 
It is clear from (B13) that the numerator is negative if  and positive if . So the 
no-gambling condition is U-shaped. 
42 
 
 
Appendix D. Real-Time Monitoring 
For the case discussed above, the regulatory capital required to deter gambling can be 
substantial, even for moderate gambles (see rows 1 and 3 in Table 2 below). One way to 
reduce the capital charge is to introduce real-time monitoring. Real-time monitoring will be 
characterised by a given probability of detecting gambling before it fails; and an associated 
punishment. For simplicity, we assume that the probability of detection is q and the 
punishment is the loss of franchise. (Later, we discuss the effect of other punishments.) In 
this case, the value function of the gambling bank becomes 
 
or  
 
Note that introducing real-time monitoring simply scales down the profits of a gambling 
bank, so the functional form of deposit contracts offered by the gambling bank are 
unchanged. 
Applying the no-gambling-condition  and re-arranging yields 
    (18‟‟) 
Given capital requirements, imposing real-time monitoring reduces gambling profits and so 
decreases the incentive to gamble. By comparing (18‟‟) with (18‟), it is clear that the net 
effect is “as if” there is an increase in franchise value. So, in terms of Figure 2, introducing 
real-time monitoring further shifts the no-gambling-condition upwards in  and  space. 
Using the no-gambling-condition (18‟‟), one can obtain the minimum capital requirements as: 
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To gauge quantitative significance of real-time monitoring of this form, we compare 
minimum capital requirements (measured in terms of deposits) for the mimicking strategy, 
, both under perfect competition and under monopoly. Results are summarised in 
Table 2 where , , ,  and . For returns under prudent 
investment, we choose  as in Allen and Gale (2007),  as in Foster and Young 
(2011) and an intermediate case where . 
 
Regime R = 2 R= 1.5 R = 1.04 
Monopoly without 
monitoring 
0.315 0.550 0.528 
Monopoly with 
monitoring 
0  0.209 0.522 
 
Perfect competition 
 
0.854 0.693 0.528 
Table 2: Minimum capital requirements under different regimes 
 
The first row in Table 2 indicates that, without monitoring, decreasing safe returns, R, 
increases the minimum prudential capital requirement. This is because smaller R implies a 
smaller franchise value, so capital requirements have to be increased to offset this and 
preserve proper incentives. The second row shows that the effect of introducing real-time 
monitoring depends crucially on the franchise value. When this is high (R=2), a moderate 
probability of detecting the gamble (30%) can substantially reduce the minimum capital 
requirement.
28
 When the franchise value is low (R=1.04), the effect on the minimum capital 
requirement is minimal.  
The third row illustrates minimum capital requirements under perfect competition: as R 
decreases, gambling by using mimicking strategy becomes less attractive, so minimum 
capital requirements decline. Note first that, for any given R, the minimum capital 
requirements under perfect competition are generally greater than those under monopoly. 
This is because there is no franchise value under perfect competition; so the gap between 
                                                             
28
Similar results are found elsewhere. Thus, in a careful calibration of the Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz 
(2000) model, Kuvshinov (2011) shows that real time monitoring can reduce minimum capital adequacy ratio 
from around 40% to 20%. 
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them shrinks as the franchise value decreases. Note also that, because of the specific form of 
the punishment used above, real-time monitoring has no effect on minimum capital 
requirements under perfect competition.  
The numerical examples illustrate how the effectiveness of our form of the real-time 
monitoring depends on the level of franchise values: becoming ineffective when the franchise 
value is low (either because of high degree of competition or low returns on prudent 
investment). One way to overcome this would be to impose an alternative (or additional) 
sanction in the form of fixed fine, for example, the loss of regulatory capital in the case where 
capital requirements are in force. By combining these two forms of sanction, real-time 
monitoring could be effective regardless of the level of franchise value. In Kuvshinov (2011), 
for example, the assumption that a competitive bank that is gambling will lose all of its equity 
capital if caught has the dramatic effect of halving the risk weighted capital requirement even 
if the chance of being detected is only 10%. 
These numerical exercises are, however, subject to a major qualification: they take no 
account of bank bailouts, so they exaggerate the prudential benefits of concentration. 
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Appendix E. Bailout and the incentive to take on tail risk: a numerical 
illustration 
 
As our framework assumes monopoly profits even when investing in the prudent asset, the 
deposit rate r is set below the prudent rate α. The parameters are as in Hellmann et al (2000) 
with values based on Sinn (2010). 
 
 
Prudent Rate α=1.05    Success return on risky asset γ=1.066  
Downside of gamble β=0.91   Probability of failing gamble π=0.9 
Discount factor δ=0.9    Capital holdings of bank k=5 
Deposit rate r=1.04 
 
 
Payoffs (Bank, Taxpayer) 
 
 
Bank
1 
Prudent 
Failure 
 
 
(-5, -x) 
 
  
Bailout: (2.8+δVB =20.98, 3.8) 
Liquidation: (2.8+δVL =12.37, 3.8) 
(1.2+δVN=12, 3.8) 
Innovative 
Success 
 
Taxpayer
Nature 
Nature 
(-5+ δVB=14.09, -4 + b=0)  
where b=4 
Liquidation 
Bailout  
Expected Payoff for the shareholder:  
Bailout: 0.9*(2.8+δVB)+0.1*(-5+ δVB)=20.9> 12 
 
Liquidation: 0.9*(2.8 δVL)+0.1*(-5)=10.63< 12 
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The profits of a monopoly (concentrated) bank are given by 
 
Profits: 
Profit of investment in the prudent return: ПN=1.2 
Profits of investment in risky return: ПG=2.8 
Payoffs and Expected Values: 
Prudent: 
Payoff and expected value to bank if it invests in the prudent investment:  
EV=1.2+δVN=12 
Bailout: 
Payoff to the bank if it invests in the risky return and assumes to be bailed out (success): 
2.8+δVB=20.98 
Payoff to the bank if it invests in the risky return and assumes to be bailed out (failure):   
-k+δVB=14.09 
The expected value for the bank of the gamble assuming it will be bailed out becomes  
20.29. 
Liquidation: 
Payoff to the bank if it invests in the risky return and assumes liquidation (success):  
2.8+δVL=12.36 
Payoff to the bank if it invests in the risky return and assumes to be bailed out (failure):  
-k =-5 
The expected value for the bank of the gamble assuming it will be bailed out becomes 
10.63. 
 
It becomes clear that if the bank knows it will be bailed out, risky innovation is preferred, otherwise it 
will invest prudently assuming liquidation is the tie breaker for the Taxpayer. 
Note 
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and VB>VN>VL. 
